In the autumn of 2026, the trustees of a university endowment reviewed a fund backed a decade earlier. It was a space fund, raised in 2016, when the pitch was simple: rockets were getting cheap, satellites were getting small, and the companies building them would be public within seven years. Ten years on, the fund had returned a fraction of the capital, its largest holding was still private, and its best-known position had been marked up four times without a dollar coming back. They were doing the arithmetic every space investor eventually does: the fund had been sold on a seven-year story, and the industry runs on a twelve-year clock.
That gap — between the story and the clock — is the central fact of space investing. Space companies take longer to build than software companies, longer to reach revenue than most venture investors expect, and longer to exit than the funds that back them are designed to last. The question is not whether space pays. It is when, and through which door the money comes back.
The clock the industry runs on
Start with the fund itself. The standard venture fund is a ten-year partnership, usually with two one-year extensions — twelve years at the contractual ceiling — and the companies it backs now stay private far longer than that. PitchBook puts the median time from founding to IPO for venture-backed companies at 9.2 years for the 2010–2019 cohort, falling to 7.5 years in the 2020–2021 boom — and the median for tech companies has since stretched to 11.5 years. In Europe, the median time to IPO reached 7.3 years in 2025, up from 5.2 years in 2020. 1752.vc’s reading of the PitchBook data puts the planning assumption at seven to ten years or more from first cheque to exit, with some positions still unrealised at year ten.
The consequence shows up in DPI — distributions to paid-in capital, cash returned, not paper marks. The average venture fund now holds positions for twelve to fourteen years against a ten-year legal term, and the median time to meaningful DPI has stretched past eight years, up from roughly five a decade ago. On 2018–2019 vintage funds, total value to paid-in — TVPI, which includes unrealised markups — runs at 2.0 to 2.5 times, while DPI, the cash actually returned, sits at 0.3 to 0.5 times. ValueAdd VC’s 2026 analysis lays out the mismatch: the investment period still runs on schedule, everything after it has slipped by three to five years. The 2025–2026 IPO cohort listed at ten to twenty-four years of age, against five to seven years for the typical listing in the 2000s. Even after a listing, the money is slow: founders typically sell about 4 percent of their stake a year, and a lead investor in a great IPO is usually ten to thirteen years in and still holding stock. SaaStr’s 2026 account of the post-IPO sell-down records the pace.
For space, the clock runs slower still, because the product has to survive physics before it can survive a market. A software company can ship in months. A satellite constellation needs years of manufacturing, a launch manifest, spectrum coordination, and ground stations — and then it needs customers willing to trust a network that did not exist the year before. The fund that backs it at seed is buying a decade of that work.
What the space record actually shows
The clearest evidence is the cohort that tried to shorten it. Between 2020 and 2022, special purpose acquisition companies carried a generation of space startups onto public exchanges — Rocket Lab, Planet, Spire, Astra, Virgin Orbit, and others — most of them pre-revenue, all valued on multi-year projections. A SpaceQ review of sixteen completed space SPAC deals found that investors who kept their shares lost money on eleven of them. Four of the sixteen have since left the stock market. Across the years their SPAC presentations gave figures for, the companies booked about 21 percent of the revenue they projected — about 13 percent once Rocket Lab is set aside. Six companies had less than $10 million of revenue in the year their deals closed. All six failed. SpaceQ’s October 2026 review of the sixteen deals scores each one against its debut price and its own forecasts.
The individual stories are stark. Virgin Orbit listed in December 2021 at a $3.7 billion valuation, raised $228 million against the $483 million it had hoped for, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2023; its assets sold at auction for $36 million — less than one percent of the listing valuation. Astra’s founders took it private for pennies a share. Rocket Lab, which went public via SPAC in August 2021 at a $4.1 billion valuation, is the exception that proves the rule: it survived by building spacecraft manufacturing and satellite components until its Space Systems division brought in more revenue than launch, and its shares traded at $51.36 in October 2026 against the $10 SPAC reference price. Planet, at $13.59, is counted as mixed. The pattern is not that space companies cannot go public. Going public early did not make them exit sooner. It made their failures public sooner, at prices the private market had not yet been forced to admit.
The exits that did happen
None of this means the money stopped moving. Space Capital’s third-quarter 2025 report counted $5.8 billion invested across 115 space companies in the quarter, with 29 exits worth $33.2 billion — three initial public offerings and twenty-six acquisitions. The report tracked cumulative private-market equity investment of $393 billion across 2,286 unique companies since 2009. The Journal of Space Commerce’s account of the Space Capital Q3 2025 report carries the figures. The European Space Policy Institute’s Space Venture 2025 report put global investment in space ventures at €11.7 billion in 2025, up 60 percent year on year, with venture funding at €8.3 billion — 71 percent of the total — and exits coming back: IPOs worth €1.2 billion and acquisitions €1.4 billion. ESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025 is the source.
Look at the shape of those exits, though, and the long clock is still there. Twenty-six acquisitions against three IPOs in a quarter is a market that exits by sale, not by listing — usually trade sales to larger aerospace and defence companies, at prices that rarely make headlines. The funding side tells the same story from the other direction. Venture funding to space tech hit a record of more than $12 billion in 2025, according to Crunchbase data, with more than two dozen companies raising rounds of $100 million or more. Stoke Space raised $510 million. Apex Space completed two rounds totalling $400 million in the year. K2 Space closed a $250 million Series C in December on top of a $110 million Series B. Exterra’s analysis of the 2025 deal flow records the concentration. Late-stage mega-rounds took the bulk of the money while seed and early-stage deal flow fell to multi-year lows. The companies that can raise $250 million are not exiting. They are staying private and pushing the exit further out — because they can.
Secondaries are doing the work
If IPOs have not done the work, something else has. PitchBook estimates US venture secondary volume at $106.3 billion in 2025, including $91.7 billion of direct secondaries and $14.6 billion of GP-led deals — and company-run tender offers have become routine at the largest private companies, including a $6.6 billion tender at OpenAI in October 2025 and a $2.6 billion tender at SpaceX in December 2025. Direct secondaries grew from 1.3 percent of global venture exit value in 2021 to 4.2 percent in 2024, with $14.7 billion transacted that year, the highest annual total since 2021. Kurums’ exit-routes analysis, drawing on PitchBook data maps the shift.
For space investors, the secondary market is now the realistic liquidity plan. GP-led secondary volume passed roughly $60 billion in 2024, and discounts of 10 to 30 percent to net asset value are common in soft markets. A tender offer lets an early holder sell a slice, not the position: selling 20 percent does nothing for the other 80 percent, and the shares kept still have to clear the same bar. Continuation funds, in which a new vehicle buys ageing assets so existing limited partners can cash out or roll, are the fastest-growing patch for funds past their term. None of these are exits in the old sense. They are partial liquidity at a discount — a pressure valve, not a door. They let some money out. They do not let the fund end.
The honest counterargument
There is a serious case that the wait is ending, and it rests on revenue rather than hope. The constellations that were slides in 2021 are now flying hardware with paying customers. Investment in geospatial intelligence applications surged from $1 billion in 2020 to a record $21.6 billion as of the third quarter of 2025, according to Space Capital’s Q3 report. Defence spending has become the primary driver, with the US Space Force potentially receiving $40 billion in fiscal year 2026, up 40 percent year on year. The 2025–2026 IPO reopening is real, even if it is concentrated in AI and fintech, and the three space IPOs in a single quarter of 2025 are more than the sector managed in most years of the last decade. A fund raised in 2016 that is still holding its largest position may simply be holding it through the part of the cycle where the value is created.
That argument deserves its weight — and it has a hole in it. The revenue arriving is arriving at the largest, best-capitalised companies — the ones that raised the mega-rounds — while the seed and early-stage pipeline that feeds the next decade has gone quiet. A market where the winners get bigger and the pipeline gets thinner is one where the next fund’s clock may run longer, not shorter. The defence budgets are real, but they are also political, and a programme that is a priority in one administration is a line item in the next. The IPO window is open, but the median company that walks through it is eleven and a half years old. None of that says the wait is wasted. It says the wait is the investment, and it should be priced as one.
What it means for everyone else
Plan for twelve to fifteen years, not seven. That changes everything downstream: the size of the commitment, the vintage diversification, the expectations set with trustees. A fund that promises a seven-year return of capital is either lucky or dishonest. Second, measurement: judge a space fund by DPI — cash returned — not TVPI, the paper value of positions that have not yet found a buyer. A TVPI of 2.5 times with a DPI of 0.4 times is a fund that created value on paper and returned almost none of it. The gap between the two numbers is the length of the wait, stated as a ratio.
The third implication: treat secondaries as part of the plan, not as a rescue. Ask, before committing, whether the manager has a secondary strategy — tender participation, strip sales, continuation vehicles — and at what discount those sales have historically cleared. A manager with no answer is a manager whose only exit plan is an IPO market that has not, for space, delivered one on schedule. Keep the SPAC lesson in view: the fastest route to a listing was also the fastest route to a public failure. The companies that survived had revenue, hardware, and cash discipline before they listed, not because the listing gave them those things. The exit does not create the business. The business creates the exit. In space, that takes about twelve years. Price the wait accordingly.
The category-defining name in space economy investing — spaceeconomyfund.com — is currently available for acquisition by the firm positioned to own this space.
Sources: 1752.vc: PitchBook median founding-to-IPO 9.2 years (2010–2019), 7.5 years in 2020–2021; direct secondaries 1.3% of global VC exit value in 2021 to 4.2% in 2024; ValueAdd VC, 2026: funds now hold 12–14 years; median time to meaningful DPI past 8 years; 2018–2019 vintage TVPI 2.0–2.5x vs DPI 0.3–0.5x; SaaStr, 2026: PitchBook median tech IPO 11.5 years; 45% of unicorns held nine years or more; founders sell about 4% a year; SpaceQ, October 2026: 16 space SPACs — investors lost on 11, four left the market, cohort delivered ~21% of projected revenue; Rocket Lab $51.36, Planet $13.59; Journal of Space Commerce, October 2025: Space Capital Q3 2025 — $5.8bn across 115 companies; 29 exits worth $33.2bn; cumulative $393bn since 2009; geospatial $21.6bn; Space Force $40bn FY2026; ESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025, April 2026: global space venture investment €11.7bn in 2025, up 60%; exits €1.2bn IPOs, €1.4bn acquisitions; Kurums, 2026: PitchBook US secondary volume $106.3bn in 2025; OpenAI $6.6bn tender, SpaceX $2.6bn tender December 2025; Exterra, 2026: Crunchbase — space VC above $12bn in 2025; Stoke Space $510m, Apex Space $400m, K2 Space $250m Series C.